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Abstract
Part I of this Article presents the background regarding the invocation of foreign and inter-
national law in federal courts. It discusses their use as precedential and supportive sources of
authority and as the bases for legal liability. Part II discusses the fundamental infirmities and dan-
gers related to the invocation of international and foreign law in U.S. jurisprudence. Further, this
Part discusses the implications of such behavior on sovereignty, the rule of law, democratic val-
ues, constitutional adherence, foreign policy, and development. In conclusion, this Article finds
that adherence or even reference to foreign and international authorities should be avoided if the
foundational principles of the Republic are to be respected.
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INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency and heightened debate,1 U.S.
courts have been citing foreign and "international" law as au-
thority for domestic decisions. 2 This trend is inappropriate, un-
democratic, and dangerous.' The judicial citation to foreign
and international law-"a relatively new and certainly controver-
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1. See ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 22 (2003)
("The insidious appeal of internationalism is illustrated by the fact that some justices of
the Supreme Court have begun to look to foreign decisions and even to foreign legisla-
tion for guidance in interpreting the Constitution."); see also Andrew B. Ayers, Note,
International Law as a Tool of Constitutional Interpretation in the Early Immigration Power
Cases, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 125, 129 (2004) ("The controversy seems only to be growing
2. See Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and Constitutional Govern-
ance, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 59, 70 (2004) (quotingJustice O'Connor as saying that the
Supreme Court "will rely increasingly on international and foreign law in resolving what
now appear to be domestic issues"); see also Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Consti-
tutional Law, 37 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 239, 245 (2003) ("[R]eferences to non-U.S. constitu-
tional law have become more frequent in recent years than they had been in the de-
cades from 1960 to 1990."). But see Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between Interna-
tional Law and Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 321 (2001) ("The
competition for authority between national sovereignty and international law has waxed
and waned for centuries.").
3. See Editorial, International Law, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 3, 2005, at A12 ("It is
now disturbingly clear that some justices no longer feel constrained by U.S. law and
increasingly rely on foreign courts and opinion.").
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sial" phenomenon 4 -is part of a larger discussion on the role of
international law in domestic governance.5 It has been de-
scribed colloquially as a "big deal,"6 and explained that "the
growing influence of international law should not be ignored. '
Indeed, the trend touches on fundamental concepts of sover-
eignty, democracy, the judicial role, and overall issues of effec-
tive governance."
There are multiple problems with thejudiciary's reliance on
extraterritorial and extra-constitutional foreign or international
sources to guide its decisions.9 Perhaps the most fundamental
flaw is its interference with rule of law values.10 To borrow from
4. Peter Berkowitz, Laws of Nations, POL'Y REV., Apr.-May 2005, at 71, 74. But see
Sean D. Murphy, The Law of the Lands: Why U.S. Courts Look Overseas, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 5, 2005, at D12 (arguing that the use of international or foreign law is not unusual
and has been appropriately applied).
5. As Professor Peter Berkowitz explains:
Among American law professors, international law became in the 90s and
continues to be today what American constitutional law was in the 70s and
80s-the fashionable front line for advancing progressive social change. Yet
even more than constitutional law, international law's sources and authority
are open to dispute. Even more than constitutional law, international law has
an ineliminable and robust political dimension.
Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 71; see also Ayers, supra note 1, at 126 ("In the last decade, a
firestorm of sorts has erupted over the role of international law in constitutional juris-
prudence. . . . Pundits, activists, legislators, and justices of the Supreme Court have
harshly criticized the use of international precedent.").
6. Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. the World, USA TODAY, June 20, 2005, at 15A
("Before your eyes glaze over or wander to a nearby cartoon, let me add: This issue is a
big deal and has already played a significant role in the court's decision-making in
recent years.").
7. Drezner, supra note 2, at 335 ("The power of international law should not be
exaggerated. . . . The question of whether international law will persistently trump
democratic sovereignty remains open to debate.").
8. See generally Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997).
9. Professor Berkowitz explains:
Critics raise a number of serious objections. First, officials of interna-
tional institutions (to say nothing of NGOs) charged with promulgating inter-
national law lack democratic accountability .... Second, as most interna-
tional institutions-possessing neither police force nor military-lack the ca-
pacity to enforce their rulings and resolutions, their legal pronouncements are
impotent and make a mockery of the rule of law. Third, international institu-
tions rely on the dangerous misconception that individuals do, or will come to,
place a premium on global citizenship ....
Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 72.
10. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY 4 (1977) ("Against the ful-
fillment of cherished ideals that turns on fortuitous appointments must be weighed the
cost of warping the Constitution, undermining the 'rule of law."').
DOMESTIC JUDICIAL INVOCATIONS
Judge Harold Leventhal, the use of international sources in judi-
cial decision-making might be described as "the equivalent of en-
tering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of
the guests for one's friends."" When judges are allowed to
cherry-pick from laws around the world to define and interpret
their laws at home, activism is emboldened and the rule of law is
diminished.' 2
The "cocktail party" analogy and debate recently reached
the U.S. Senate floor when the newly appointed Chief Justice
John Roberts went through his confirmation hearings.1 3  Re-
sponding to questions on the trend of using foreign or interna-
tional laws, Chief Justice Roberts rejected its legitimacy and cau-
tioned its dangers:
Domestic precedent can confine and shape the discre-
tion of the judges. Foreign law, you can find anything you
want. If you don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy,
it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wher-
ever. As somebody said in another context, looking at for-
eign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and pick-
ing out your friends. You can find them. They're there. And
that actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the
judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them
11. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Judge Harold Leventhal on the subjective process of using legislative history in stat-
utory interpretation); see also DonaldJ. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on
the Scope of the "Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153, 189
n.196 (1998) (presenting this analogy).
12. As Senator John Kyl (R-Ariz.) stated, "it would put us on a dangerous path by
trying to pick and choose among those foreign laws that we liked or didn't like." I
Believe That No One Is Above the Law Under Our System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A26
[hereinafter Above the Law]; see also Sheryl Young, Roberts' Confirmation Offers Acid Test For
Senate, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 2, 2005, at 13 (editorializing that reliance on international
opinion in interpreting U.S. law "contradicts our Constitution, interferes with the rights
of citizens to a fair trial and endangers our national sovereignty"); House Resolution on
the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States: Hearing on H.R. 97 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 23 (2005) (statement of M. Edward Whelan, III, President, Ethics
and Public Policy Center) [hereinafter Whelan Testimony] ("Preserving her own flexi-
bility to pick and choose opportunistically, [Justice Ruth B.] Ginsburg also utterly fails
to delineate any principle that would dictate when foreign decisions should come into
play and what weight they should have."). Speaking of the six Supreme Court Justices
that have invoked international or foreign law, Whelan also testified that "these six
Justices see foreign law as another powerful tool that they can wield whenever it suits
them." Id. at 27.
13. See Above the Law, supra note 12.
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with the authority of precedent-because they're finding prece-
dent in foreign law-and use that to determine the meaning
of the Constitution."
4
Chief Justice Roberts's comments underscore the concern that
reference or reliance on extraterritorial laws can be abused to
buttress an activist's conclusion.
The debate has also recently hit the floor of the U.S. House
of Representatives. For example, on February 15, 2005, House
Resolution 97 was introduced to express the sense of the House
that invocations of foreign law are improper.1 5 House Resolu-
tion 97 read, in part:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representa-
tives that judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of
the Constitution of the United States should not be based in
whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of
foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or
pronouncements inform an understanding of the original
meaning of the Constitution of the United States.' 6
That resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,
14. Id. (emphasis added). One leading commentator predicted nominees would
be asked about this issue. See Mauro, supra note 6, at 15A ("So here is a safer prediction:
When and if a new justice is nominated, he or she will be grilled about an issue you
have probably not heard much about: whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to
use international or foreign law as a resource in deciding U.S. cases.").
15. See Whelan Testimony, supra note 12, at 16 ("House Resolution 97 is a fit and
proper step in response to the Supreme Court's improper reliance on foreign law.").
16. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). The preceding text of Resolution 97 pro-
vides that:
Whereas the Declaration of Independence announced that one of the
chief causes of the American Revolution was that King George had "combined
to subject us to ajurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged
by our laws";
Whereas the Supreme Court has recently relied on the judgments, laws,
or pronouncements of foreign institutions to support its interpretations of the
laws of the United States, most recently in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472,
2474 (2003);
Whereas the Supreme Court has stated previously in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997), that "We think such comparative analysis
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution ..."
Whereas Americans' ability to live their lives within clear legal boundaries
is the foundation of the rule of law, and essential to freedom;
Whereas it is the appropriate judicial role to faithfully interpret the ex-
pression of the popular will through the Constitution and laws enacted by duly
elected representatives of the American people and our system of checks and
balances;
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on how to live
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and on September 29, 2005, the Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion referred it to the full Committee. 7 House Resolution 97
had been preceded by proposed House Resolution 568 in 2004,
which similarly attempted to call for the courts to refrain from
citing foreign or international law."8
Sovereignty dictates that a Nation governs itself and creates
their lives from the often contradictory decisions of any of hundreds of other
foreign organizations; and
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or
pronouncments [sic] threatens the sovereignty of the United States, the sepa-
ration of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved.
Id.
17. See Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status-House Resolution 97, http://
thomas.loc.gov (search for H Res 97) (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
18. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) ("Whereas the Declaration of Inde-
pendence announced that one of the chief causes of the American Revolution was that
King George had 'combined to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution
and unacknowledged by our laws.'"). Resolution 568 also declared:
Whereas Americans should not have to look for guidance on how to live
their lives from the often contradictory decisions of any of hundreds of other
foreign organizations; and
Whereas inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign judgments, laws, or
pronouncments [sic] threatens the sovereignty of the United States, the sepa-
ration of powers and the President's and the Senate's treaty-making authority
Id.; see also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hear-
ing on H.R. Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciaiy,
108th Cong. 32 (2004) (statement of Professor John 0. McGinnis, Professor of Law,
Northwestern University), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/mcginnis
032504.pdf ("[[P] romiscuous use of foreign law will undermine domestic support for
the Constitution"); id. at 10-14 (statement ofJeremy Rabkin, Professor of Law, Cornell
University), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/rabkin032504.htm ("Appeals
to foreign practice tend to undermine the notion that we really do (or really should)
have a distinct constitution in our own country."); id. at 18-28 (statement of Michael D.
Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of San Diego), available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary/ramsey032504.pdf (When courts [use foreign materials to support decisions
of moral and social policy ], the rule of law and the role of courts is undermined."). See
generally Stuart Taylor, Jr., Should Foreign Law Be Used to Interpret Our Constitution?, 36
NAT'L J. 689 (2004) (identifying risks and benefits of importing foreign law); Ayers,
supra note 1, at 128 ("[S]everal dozen members of the U.S. House of Representatives
introduced a resolution condemning the Supreme Court's use of international jurispru-
dence."); Jeffrey McDermott, Citation to Foreign Precedent: Congress vs. the Courts, FED.
LAWYER, July 2004, at 20 (discussing House Resolution 568); Tom Curry, A Flap over
Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in Big
Cases, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/ (discussing contro-
versy surrounding use of foreign precedent in constitutional analysis).
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its own laws, not outsiders. 19 We in the United States create our
own laws, or do we? As Blackstone stated, "[s]overeignty and leg-
islature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without
the other."2 Internalization of governance and control is criti-
cal to the concept that a Nation may, and indeed has the prerog-
ative to, govern itself.21 When authorities begin to allow the
piercing of the veil of sovereignty-allowing outside sources to
pierce the boundaries of domestic law-there is a surrender of
the legislative autonomy a Nation holds in a Westphalian sys-
tem.22 A Nation's right to exclude, the right to include, and the
methods for determining lie at the heart of sovereign author-
ity.23
If the legislature is the ultimate lawmaking power, however,
is it appropriate for the judiciary to look beyond domestic pro-
nouncements of law and invoke foreign or international pro-
nouncements of "law" to decide governance standards? 24 This is
the fundamental question addressed in this Article.
Predilections of particular judges should not punctuate do-
mestic pronouncements or allow the projection of international
standards into controlling law when not promulgated through
the political process. Such actions are outside the judicial role.25
19. See, e.g., JEREMY A. RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATrERS (1998).
20. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *46.
21. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN-
MENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005). Peter Berkowitz has summarized Rabkin's
position as follows:
The United States should hold fast to the doctrine of state sovereignty because
abandoning it would be both unlawful and unwise, contravening the Constitu-
tion and endangering the rights of American citizens while leaving responsibil-
ity for the protection of human rights around the world to unaccountable
authorities and in weak hands.
Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 78.
22. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 4-5 ("The Court has shown in the past that
the Constitution can also be twisted to frustrate the needs of democracy.").
23. See, e.g., NIHAL JAYAWiCKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAw: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 17 (2002) ("[A] sover-
eign state [traditionally] had full, complete and exclusive authority to deal with its own
territory and with its own nationals.").
24. See, e.g., Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights and Self-Determination: The
Meaning of International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1477, 1510-23 (2001) (contending
that "reproductive rights" claims are not human rights claims cognizable in the courts).
25. See Connell, supra note 2, at 61 ("Recently... the Supreme Court has shown
that the absence of shared American history and values is no obstacle to the Court's
imposing its view on the American people.").
DOMESTIC JUDICIAL INVOCATIONS
When the British colonies in North America chose to cast
off their chains by revolution, they chose to create a sovereign
Nation-State that was beyond the shackles and controls of
outside influences.26 The U.S. Declaration of Independence de-
clared that "[King George III] has combined with others to sub-
ject us to ajurisdiction foreign to our constitution, "27 in an effort
to justify the need for independence and revolution. This was to
be a country that would govern itself and create its own rules.
Independence and foreign control were anathema. Reliance on
uniquely U.S. law was seen as the appropriate standard, guiding
force, and goal for the creation of the new, independent coun-
try-or so it seemed. Other countries have made similar de-
mands to be free from extraterritorial control. For example,
France's Declaration of the Rights of Man states: "The nation is
essentially the source of all sovereignty: nor can any individual
or any body of men be entitled to any authority which is not
expressly derived from it."'28 Courts with the authority and duty
to pronounce the state of the law must determine what the law
is, and in so doing, must understand that the sovereign is the
source from which law emanates.
Yet, today there is an emerging and growing debate regard-
ing the judicial invocation and citation of international or for-
eign law to inform the domestic decisions on U.S. law-both as
persuasive and sometimes as controlling authority. 29 Courts in-
terpreting U.S. law should be interpreting U.S. law-law distinct
to the U.S. legal system."0 The invocation of foreign or interna-
tional sources in judicial opinions circumvents the solemn duty
of the judiciary to decide what the law is, not what it should be.3"
The recent confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts
26. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
27. Id. at para. 3.
28. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (France 1789), quoted in THOMAS PAINE,
POLITICAL WRITINGS 115 (Bruce Kuklick ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1791).
29. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 21 (advancing a theory of inter-
national law as a product of national self-interest).
30. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of the United States, The Court and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/constitutional.pdf ("The
Supreme Court is distinctly American in concept and function, as ChiefJustice Charles
Evans Hughes observed.") (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
31. Chief Justice John Marshall stated that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (uphold-
ing Marbury's principle in noting that "the judicial department has no business enter-
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reflect the growing debate over the tension between sovereign
control and foreign influence. As an Investor's Business Daily edi-
torial phrased it:
On Sept. 17, 1787, the constitution of the world's oldest
democratic republic was completed and signed by a majority
of the delegates attending a convention in Philadelphia. It's
that constitution that Roberts, if confirmed as Chief Justice,
will swear to defend, protect and interpret as written. And no
one else's.
[W]hen asked what, "if anything, is the proper role of
foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions?"
"If we're relying on a decision from a German judge
about what our Constitution means, no president accounta-
ble to the people appointed that judge and no Senate ac-
countable to the people confirmed that judge," Roberts re-
plied. "And yet he's playing a role in shaping the law that
binds the people in this country. I think that's a concern that
has to be addressed."
It is a growing and disturbing trend in recent Supreme
Court decisions .... 32
The question becomes whether judicial invocation of interna-
tional and foreign law is appropriate. 3 This Article contends
that it is indeed inappropriate and dangerous.
AsJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated, "[t] here is no
mystic over-law to which even the United States must bow."3 4
taining . . . question[s] entrusted to one of the political branches are or [that] in-
volve[ ] no judicially enforceable rights.")
32. Editorial, We the (American) People, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Sept. 20, 2005, at
A13.
33. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REv. 639 (2005) [hereinafter Afford, Constitutional Comparativism]; Daniel
Bodansky, The Uses of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 421 (2004); Roger P. Alford, The Misuse of International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 57, 63 (2004) [hereinafter Afford, Misuse of International
Sources].
34. In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922). Justice Holmes stated:
In deciding this question we must realize that however ancient may be the
traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which it has been
drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country from its having been
accepted and adopted by the United States. There is no mystic over-law to
which even the United States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by
foreign law or by general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that
for this purpose the sovereign power takes up a rule suggested from without
and makes it part of its own rules.
DOMESTIC JUDICIAL INVOCATIONS
James Madison made a similar observation in Federalist No. 42
when discussing the issue of offenses and felonies on the high
seas and the import of foreign or international law, stating that
"neither the common, nor the statute law of that or of any other
nation ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless
previously made its own by legislative adoption." 35 Importation
of these over-laws in recentjudicial decisions is entirely inappro-
priate for a country that has a constitution and a commitment to
govern itself.
Part I of this Article presents the background regarding the
invocation of foreign and international law in federal courts. It
discusses their use as precedential and supportive sources of au-
thority and as the bases for legal liability. Part II discusses the
fundamental infirmities and dangers related to the invocation of
international and foreign law in U.S. jurisprudence. This Part
discusses the implications of such behavior on sovereignty, the
rule of law, democratic values, constitutional adherence, foreign
policy, and development. In conclusion, this Article finds that
adherence or even reference to foreign and international au-
thorities should be avoided if the foundational principles of the
Republic are to be respected.
I. THE U.S. JUDICIARY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Over the past several years, the invocation of foreign and
international law in domestic judicial opinions has been rising in
a number of contentious areas of law.36 As the trend continues,
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), at 303-04 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
36. See Mauro, supra note 6, at 15A ("In landmark rulings upholding affirmative
action, supporting gay rights and, most recently, striking down the death penalty for
juvenile offenders, justices have invoked the practices of foreign nations and the rulings
of international courts, e.g., to support their conclusions."). There are a variety of cases
citing or discussing international or foreign laws, besides the prominent three recent
cases. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (discussing worldwide
disapproval of capital punishment for the mentally retarded); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (1988)) (arguing
that the opinions of the "World Community" should not bear on the meaning of the
Constitution); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 992-93 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing Canadian and European cases finding "that delays of 15
years or less can render capital punishment degrading, shocking, or cruel"); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-96 (1999) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari) (citing cases from Canada, India, and Jamaica that consider "lengthy incarcera-
tion before execution" as potentially violating "principles of fundamental justice") (in-
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parties of all political preferences have an interest-and may be
impacted-if foreign sources of authority are given legitimacy.17
This trend has opened the door to new sources of political advo-
cacy that may impact the agendas of the left, center, and right.38
This trend has permeated decisions in U.S. district courts, courts
of appeals, state courts, and even the U.S. Supreme Court. 9 At
least six Justices on the Rehnquist Court have referenced foreign
and international law as influence in their decisions.4 °
ternal quotations omitted); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (stat-
ing that while comparative surveys of national laws might be helpful in drafting a
constitution, a comparative survey of such contemporary laws is not an appropriate aid
to for constitutional interpretation); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989)
(rejecting the relevance of sentencing practices of other nations); id. at 389-90 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (discussing the general disapproval of execution of juvenile offend-
ers among the world community); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 (enumerating nations
that do not execute juveniles); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (urging that biblical and historical sources invoked by petitioner
cut against the argument petitioner advanced); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-
97 n.22 (1982) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)) (stating that
international opinion "concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment" is "not
irrelevant"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (referring to "evolving stan-
dards of decency," "a maturing society," and "objective indicia derived from history" in
addressing challenges to the constitutionality of "double celling," whereby two prison-
ers were housed in one cell) (internal quotations omitted); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10
(1977) (referencing a 1965 survey of "major nations" regarding the imposition of the
death penalty in rape cases); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (stating that denial of medical care is not among the punishments that
civilized nations should allow); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35 (1958) (describing
the international consensus among the world's democracies that "statelessness" is a
deplorable condition).
37. As legal commentator Jeffrey Rosen opines:
Conservatives are right to fear the internationalization of the culture
wars-that is, the danger that American traditions will be struck down in the
name of international values. But liberals should fear this development as
well. Kenneth Anderson of the Washington College of Law predicts that, in
the wake of Roper, citations to international authorities "will spread through-
out the U.S. judicial system like an Internet virus-because both sides will have
to assume in any litigation that it now matters." We may soon see shaky claims
about a purported international consensus invoked in cases ranging from cor-
porate litigation to free speech. And liberal values will hardly be reliable win-
ners.
Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic-Court Outsourcing, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 2005, at 11.
38. See, e.g., id. ("To the degree that foreign authorities do agree about moral val-
ues in other cases involving basic rights, they tend to be far less consistently progressive
than liberals assume.").
39. See, e.g., Alford, Constitutional Comparativism, supra note 33; Afford, Misuse of
International Sources, supra note 33; Bodansky, supra note 33.
40. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Is There Room for the World in Our Courts?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2005, at B4 ("Breyer and at least five other members of the [Rehnquist Court],
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A. Recent Notable U.S. Judicial Invocations of International
and Foreign Law
Three recent Supreme Court cases highlight the trend and
debate over the invocation of foreign and international law in
domestic judicial decisions-Atkins v. Virginia,4 1 Lawrence v.
Texas,42 and Roper v. Simmons.4" Each involved decisions of U.S.
domestic law, but several Justices endorsed references to foreign
and international law in reaching their decisions.4 4
on the other hand, argue that international norms should inform our constitutional
analysis in a world increasingly united by globalization, democratization and the spread
of universal human rights.").
41. 536 U.S. 304. For commentary, see J. Richard Broughton, Off the Rails of a
Crazy Train ?: The Structural Consequences of Atkins and Modern Death Penalty Jurisprudence,
11 WIDENER L. REV. 1 (2004); Connell, supra note 2, at 61 ("[T]he majority's reliance
on European law in those cases, to justify its interpretation of the United States Consti-
tution, improperly interferes in matters that historically have been left to state legisla-
tures, thereby undermining both principles of federalism and American sovereignty.");
Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial Review, 11 WIDENER L. REV.
23 passim (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on foreign authority, par-
ticularly in Atkins, interferes with state tort law); and Harold Koh, International Law as
Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 55-57 (2004) (suggesting that Lawrence and Atkins
represent the demise of "national jurisprudence" and such decisions' reliance on
"transnational legal materials" forecast precedential reliance on international and for-
eign laws).
42. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For commentary, see Rex D. Glensy,
Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority,
45 VA.J. INT'L L. 357 passim (2005);Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a
"Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law
in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1304-05 (2004); Nelson
Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REv.
1555, 1607 (2004) ("Flaunting a cosmopolitan sensibility may be quite chic, but this
high style comes with a price."); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 73 (2004).
43. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
44. For an early discussion of Supreme Court cases that have addressed issues of
international law, see generally Paul B. Stephan III, International Law in the Supreme
Court, 1990 SuP. CT. REv. 133, 134 (1990) (identifying "a conception of international
law as a body of contingent principles derived from intergovernmental bargaining"). In
addition to the cases discussed herein, see also Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg's concurring
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 439 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (not-
ing that suggestions regarding the appropriateness of affirmative action are in "accord
... with the international understanding of the office of affirmative action," citing the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
For commentary, seeJeremy A. Rabkin, Recalling the Case for Sovereignty, 5 CHI.J. INT'L L.
435, 447 (2005) ("[T]he Supreme Court has indicated that international practice or
international opinion can justify reinterpreting the US Constitution, even when the
new interpretation runs precisely contrary to interpretations previously advance by the
Court itself.").
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In Atkins v. Virginia,4 5 the Court invalidated laws providing
that mentally retarded offenders could be sentenced to death,
using in part foreign authorities. In the footnotes, the majority
cited the opinion of the "world community" to support its con-
clusion.4 6 The Court relied, in part, on an amicus brief filed by
the European Union, concluding that "within the world commu-
nity, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disap-
proved."4 7 Not shockingly, Justice Antonin Scalia (joined by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas)
dissented and disagreed with the Court's invocation of extrater-
ritorial authority. Scalia stated in dissent:
[T]he Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
"national consensus" must go to its appeal (deservedly rele-
gated to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional and
religious organizations, members of the so-called "world com-
munity," and respondents to opinion polls .... [I]rrelevant
are the practices of the "world community," whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people. "...
[W] here there is not first a settled consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the
Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be im-
posed upon Americans through the Constitution. "48
Justice Scalia's dissent contributed to a growing debate as to the
utility and appropriateness of world views in defining domestic
law.
Lawrence v. Texas found unconstitutional a Texas statute bar-
ring same-sex sodomy. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony
Kennedy cited as authority a decision by the European Court of
Human Rights permitting homosexual conduct as evidence of a
lack of consensus on such conduct's illegality.4" Again, Justice
Scalia (joined by then Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas) dissented, in part because of the Court's reference to
foreign authorities. Here, Justice Scalia stated in dissent:
In any event, an "emerging awareness" is by definition
45. 536 U.S. 304.
46. See id. at 316 n.21.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 34748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 868-69 n.4 (1988)).
49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
DOMESTIC JUDICIAL INVOCATIONS
not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s],"
as we have said "fundamental right" status requires. Constitu-
tional entitlements do not spring into existence ... because
foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority
opinion never relied on "values we share with a wider civiliza-
tion," but rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the
ground that such a right was not "'deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition."' Bowers' rational-basis holding is
likewise devoid of any reliance on the views of a "wider civili-
zation,".... The Court's discussion of these foreign views...
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however,
since "this Court.. . should not impose foreign moods, fads,
or fashions on Americans."50
According to Justice Scalia, domestic law should not be defined
by, nor depend on, international or foreign views.
The most recent Supreme Court debate over the invocation
of international or foreign law came in the March 2005 decision
in Roper v. Simmons. 1 Roper held that the Constitution forbids
the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders-those
under age eighteen when their crimes were committed.52 The
Court relied substantially on the supposed views of the "interna-
tional community" on the matter.5 Justice Kennedy wrote the
50. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
51. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); see also Tony Mauro, Justices Divided on Juvenile Execu-
tions, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18, 2004, at 10 (summarizing oral argument in Roper).
52. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
53. See id. at 1198-1200. As SenatorJohn Kyl explained:
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court not only, in my view, engaged in
questionable analysis of American law, it spent perhaps 20 percent of its legal
analysis discussing the laws of Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, Paki-
stan, Nigeria and China. The court claimed that we ought not to, "stand alone
on this issue" and that we should pay attention to what other nations do when
we interpret our Constitution.
Above the Law, supra note 12, at A26. But an alternative reading of Roper downplays the
foreign influence:
[I]f foreign and international law does no more than merely confirm judg-
ments already reached on domestic grounds, the majority gave it far more
emphasis than strictly needed.
The real role of foreign and international law in the outcome was proba-
bly more than the majority let on, but less than the exaggerated claims of
Scalia.
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., Top Court Embraces a World View, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 4,
2005, at 5.
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majority opinion. Legal commentator Jeffrey Toobin has
opined that Justice Kennedy "has become a leading proponent
of one of the most cosmopolitan, and controversial, trends in
constitutional law: using foreign and international law as an aid
in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 54 Justice Kennedy raised
such ire with his decision in Roper that some were even calling
for his impeachment.55 Justice Kennedy's confidence that the
judiciary can discern international consensus has been described
as wrong and, at the very least, questionable.56
Roper clearly represents a significant turning point in the ac-
ceptance of foreign and international precedent to define do-
mestic law.57 Indeed, some have described it as a "sweeping"
opening for new activism.58
54. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42; see also Tony
Mauro, Justices Defend Judiciary Against Hill, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 2005, at 14 (describing
questioning ofJustice Anthony Kennedy on the invocation of foreign and international
law during budgetary hearings regarding the judiciary); Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick
Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at Al ("In writing a
decision this year that banned the death penalty for juveniles, Justice Anthony Kennedy
bolstered his argument by citing similar bans in such questionable arenas of human
rights as Nigeria and Iran.").
55. See Tony Mauro, A Revolution on Hold: As the Supreme Court Embraced Moderation,
the Conservative Agenda Stalled, LEGAL TIMES, June 27, 2005, at 1 ("Conservatives pounced
on Kennedy, asserting that his invocation of international law and norms was a nearly
impeachable offense."); see also Margaret Talev, Conservatives Still Holding Supreme
Grudge, FORT WAYNEJ. GAZETTE (Ind.), May 6, 2005, at 1lA (claiming that Roper "simul-
taneously enraged capital punishment advocates and nationalists who say that what hap-
pens in other countries should have no bearing on how a judge interprets U.S. law").
56. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 37, at 11 ("Kennedy is also wrong to suggest that it's
possible to generalize meaningfully about a purported international consensus on any
hotly contested issue involving life or death, crime or punishment.").
57. See Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, PoL'y REv., June-
July 2005, at 33 ("Until [Roper] was handed down ... it remained possible to view the
appearance of foreign law in constitutional decisions as nothing more than a minor
hobbyhorse for Justice Stephen Breyer orJustice Kennedy-a merely rhetorical nod.").
58. See, e.g., id. at 34. Anderson argues:
Justice Kennedy's Roper majority opinion puts paid to the conceit that this
is all just a bit of fluff exaggerated into something sinister and conspiratorial
by Federalist Society right-wing ideologues. Roper asserts far more, it turns out,
than the prior use of foreign law in contemporary constitutional cases would
have suggested. It blesses in the contemporary era a new doctrine of constitu-
tional adjudication, what has been called "constitutional comparativism," that
is very far indeed from mere flirtation. It invites the deployment of a sweeping
body of legal materials from outside U.S. domestic law into the process of
interpreting the U.S. Constitution-and, moreover, invites it into American
society's most difficult and contentious "values" questions.
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Adding emphasis to the internationalization of domestic ju-
risprudence, foreigners and non-governmental organizations
have entered the fray.59 Trying to influence outcomes in favor
of foreign and international opinions, Roper is an instance where
such parties appeared as amici to attempt to influence the re-
sults. 60 This type of court-centered lobbying can be valuable to
such individuals and groups when attempting to gain ground in
advancing group preferences that may not be successful through
the democratic process.6" When the courts are willing to listen
to groups who rely on extraterritorial sources, there is a greater
incentive for such groups to become involved in litigation.
Dissenting in Roper, Justice Scalia (in an opinion joined by
then Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) sharply dis-
59. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN & JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS, GLOBAL GOVERN-
ANCE (1999); JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS 1 (1998); Sanford E. Gaines, Global and
Regional Perspectives on International Environmental Protection, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 983,
1000-03 (1997) (detailing the substantial role played by NGOs in the formation and
structure of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Commission on Environmen-
tal Cooperation, and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation).
See generally Christopher C. Homer, Modern Developments in the Treaty Process: Re-
cent Developments Regarding Advice and Consent, Withdrawal, and the Growing Role
of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Agreements with Particular Exami-
nation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Federalist Soc'y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies White
Paper, available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3243.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2006) (citing a
report, among others, on bias in the selection process at the 2002 United Nations Child
Summit).
60. See, e.g., David Stout, Dozens of Nations Weigh In on Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2004, at A14 ("Countries from the European Union along with Canada, Mexico
and other nations filed friend of the court briefs in a Missouri death penalty case. So
did former President Jimmy Carter, former Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev and
others, including the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association and
religious groups."); Phyllis Schlafly, Global Benchmarks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at
A13 ("The Supreme Court recently accepted amicus briefs from Mikhail Gorbachev
and from 48 foreign countries in a case considered this fall involving the death penalty
for juveniles .... The justices have increasingly cited foreign law to weaken our death
penalty, though the U.S. Constitution in several places expressly recognizes its legal-
ity."); id. ("Earlier this year, the Supreme Court allowed the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities for the first time to present oral argument as a friend of the
court.").
61. See Robert H. Bork, Travesty Time, Again: In Its Death-Penalty Decision, the Su-
preme Court Hits a New Low, NAT'L REv., Mar. 28, 2005, at 17 ("What is clear is that
foreign elites understand the importance of having the Supreme Court on their side,
which is precisely why their human-rights [sic] organizations have begun filing amicus
briefs urging our Supreme Court to adopt the foreign, elite view of the American Con-
stitution."). See generally Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Cus-
tomary International Law: The Role of NGOs and United States Courts, 22 BERKELEYJ. ITrr'L
L. 240 (2004).
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agreed with the Court's reliance on foreign sources to reach its
conclusion.62 Justice Scalia argued that reliance on supposed in-
ternational consensus was entirely inappropriate in setting do-
mestic constitutional standards:
More fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the
Court's argument-that American law should conform to the
laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of
hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it. In many
significant respects the laws of most other countries differ
from our law-including not only such explicit provisions of
our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury in-
dictment, but even many interpretations of the Constitution
prescribed by this Court itself.
6 3
After describing multiple court rulings that would need to be
overturned if the Court were to consistently rely on foreign
sources of authority, Justice Scalia continued:
The Court should either profess its willingness to recon-
sider all these matters in light of the views of foreigners, or
else it should cease putting forth foreigners' views as part of
the reasoned basis of its decisions. To invoke alien law when it
agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is
not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.
64
62. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217-30 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
see also Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court Bans Death Penalty for Juveniles, DAILY Bus. REV.
(Broward), Mar. 2, 2005, at 10 (" I]n the fullest exposition of deep disagreements over
the value of foreign law in the court's jurisprudence, [Justice] Scalia upbraided the
majority for selectively invoking the international consensus against executing juveniles
while ignoring it in other contexts, such as abortion rights.").
63. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1228. Much commentary in the press after Roper endorsed Scalia's con-
cerns. See, e.g., A. Barton Hinkle, The Constitution Does Not Consist of World Public Opinion,
RCHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 4, 2005, at AlI ("[Justice] Kennedy's suggestion is
profoundly disturbing for revealing his willingness to-well, to put aside the issue of
whether the juvenile death penalty is constitutional, and to substitute what he thinks
the rest of the world thinks for what the Constitution and precedent actually say.");
Thomas P. Kilgannon, Does the Constitution Matter, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at A15
("[F] ivejug-headed jurists on the Supreme Court invoked international law, European
opinion and a concept they dubbed 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,' to find in the Constitution a right of immunity from the
death penalty for minors."); Ed Feulner, Courting Trouble, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005,
at A18 (calling Roper "judicial overreach," and noting that "[t]he United States has an
excellent Constitution, and plenty of homegrown laws. We don't need to import any
from foreign lands. Ourjudges must confine themselves to interpreting our own laws,
instead of subjecting us to foreign laws."). But see Mauro, supra note 6, at 15A ("But to
hear conservatives' violent reaction to the decision, you would think that it was the only
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In sum, Justice Scalia exclaimed that the Court's invocation of
international and foreign authorities is selective, activist, and in-
appropriate.65
Also dissenting in Roper, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor re-
fused to go as far as Scalia. Justice O'Connor explained that in-
ternational and foreign law has a role in U.S. jurisprudence:
I disagree . . . that foreign and international law have no
place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the
course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently re-
ferred to foreign and international law as relevant to its as-
sessment of evolving standards of decency. . . . Obviously,
American law is distinctive in many respects .... But this
Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is
neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we
should not be surprised to find congruence between domes-
tic and international values, especially where the interna-
tional community has reached clear agreement-expressed
in international law or in the domestic laws of individual
countries-that a particular form of punishment is inconsis-
tent with fundamental human rights.66
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority, but she did not
fault the majority for relying on international and foreign laws as
authority to inform constitutional interpretation.67
justification, and that [Justice] Kennedy had suddenly ceded the authority of the Su-
preme Court to the laws of Klingon, or Mars.").
65. For a commentary that Justice Scalia "overstates" the concern, see, for exam-
ple, Stanley E. Adelman, Supreme Court Bans Death Penalty for Under-1 8 Offenders, ComR c-
TIONs TODAY, Aug. 1, 2005, at 58. Also, for commentary contrary to Justice Scalia's
critique, see Marcia Coyle, Foreign Law Is Key in Juvenile Capital Case: Justices Split on Non-
U.S. Law's Role, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 11, 2004, at 1 (endorsing a greater international role in
domestic judicial decisionmaking); Martha F. Davis, Don't Gag U.S. Courts, MiAMi DAILY
Bus. REv., Aug. 30, 2004, at 6 (calling reference to foreign laws a "fruitful approach"
that "ensures that Supreme Court decisions canvass for the best ideas and approaches
available," and accusing Congress of placing a "'gag order' on the federal courts" by
trying to demand they refrain from examining foreign laws); Amy Howe, A Little
Worldly, LEGAL TIMES, July 5, 2004, at 50 (describing an "increasingly interdependent
international legal system," and noting that "any progress is welcome and, at bottom,
inevitable.... U.S. courts cannot shy away from their basic duty of stating what the law
is, not only with regard to the other branches of government but also in the interna-
tional system."); and id. ("The role of both foreign legal materials and international law
in cases turning on interpretations of the U.S. Constitution remains the most conten-
tious-even if the hullabaloo so far has proved to be much ado about nothing.").
66. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. For a discussion of the emerging presence of international law, including an
2006] 523
524 FORDHAM INIERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:507
Outside the courtroom, at speeches and in the press, several
Supreme Court Justices have recently expressed their views on
the use of international law in interpretation and decisions of
U.S. law.6" For example, several Justices have delivered presenta-
tions on the topic.69 In January 2005, Justices Scalia and Breyer
even engaged in an unprecedented debate on the use of interna-
opening essay by U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day O'Connor on the matter, see
generally Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and International Tribunals,
28 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1996). See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 32, atA13 ("[Justice]
O'Connor said recently, 'I suspect that over time we will rely increasingly on... interna-
tional and foreign courts in examining domestic issues."').
68. See, e.g., Editorial, Other Nation's Laws, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at B2. Nota-
ble comments include:
As Yale's Harold Koh has put it in the past, the point of the new thinking
is "bringing international law home." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg said in
2003 that she hoped America could discard its "Lone Ranger" approach to the
Constitution. Justice Stephen Breyer, who has invoked the rulings of
Zimbabwe and India in his opinions, said on ABC's "This Week" in 2003 that
Americans will need to figure out whether the Constitution "fits into the gov-
erning documents of other nations." Justice O'Connor herself has a track re-
cord here. In 1997 she said that American judges and lawyers "sometimes
seem a bit insular" and "forget that there are other legal systems in the world."
Id.
69. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Com-
parative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003); Mauro, supra
note 6, at 15A ("But in today's world, ignoring it altogether is not an option, [Justice
O'Connor] has said. In a speech before the American Society of International Law in
2002, [justice] O'Connor put it this way: 'Because of the scope of the problems that we
face, understanding international law is no longerjust a legal specialty. It is becoming a
duty.'"); Schlafly, supra note 60, at A13 ("In a speech last year, Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg told the American Constitution Society that 'your perspective on constitutional
law should encompass the world.'"); Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address Before the Ameri-
can Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.humanrights
first.org/us_law/inthecourts/SupremeCourt NewInterlLawjustBreyer% 20.pdf,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Looking Beyond Our Bor-
ders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Address
Before the American Constitution Society (Aug. 2, 2003), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/Ginsburg-transcript_080203.pdf; Sandra
Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks to the Southern Center
for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
us law/inthecourts/SOUTHERNCENTERINTERNATIONAL STUDIES-Justice_0
%27Connor.pdf; Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote
Address, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-
law/inthecourts/ASILKeynoteAdd_2002 JustO%27Connor.pdf; Whelan Testimony,
supra note 12, at 21 ("On April 1, 2005, Justice Ginsburg delivered a speech to the
American Society of International Law that defended the Supreme Court's increasing
use of foreign law in support of its rulings on the meaning of the Constitution.").
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tional law in U.S. jurisprudence, broadcast on C-SPAN. 70
Most recently in April 2005, Justices Stephen Breyer,
O'Connor, and Scalia again sat down to publicly debate the pro-
priety of using foreign or international law in decisionmaking.
Again, it was covered on C-SPAN and discussed in the press, and
highlighted some of the stark differences of opinion between
the Justices on the appropriate jurisprudential approach.71
These unusual appearances and pronouncements by typi-
cally insulated judges demonstrate the current intensity of this
debate. It also illustrates that the proper judicial role in relation
to foreign and international precedents is an ongoing discussion
with an ongoing progression towards this resort to extraterrito-
rial precedential support.
70. See Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin
Scalia and Stephen Breyer, Jan. 13, 2005, http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/
mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F89
0068E6E0?OpenDocument; see also Justices Debate Role of International Law in Rare
Televised Debate, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.ap.org/ (search for title in "AP Archive");
Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. Soc'v
INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004); Charles Lane, The Court Is Open for Discussion, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2005 ("It was the first time in recent memory that two sitting justices represent-
ing opposing factions on the court took their disagreements so completely public, and
the effect was, at times, electrifying."); Mauro, supra note 62, at 10 ("[Justice Scalia]
relented in his usual opposition toward broadcast coverage of his remarks on [January]
13 when he allowed C-SPAN to air a debate between him andJustice Stephen Breyer on
the issue at American University. [Justice] Kennedy sat stone-faced as [Justice] Scalia
scoffed at his decision in one of the most vituperative dissents in years.").
71. The following summary is an example of press coverage of the April 2005 de-
bate:
[T]he National Constitution Center hosted a "Constitutional Conversation"
with three other justices: Stephen Breyer, Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day
O'Connor.
For her part, [Justice] O'Connor surmised that "over time we will rely
increasingly . . . on international and foreign courts in examining domestic
issues." Added [Justice] Breyer: "We see all the time ... how the world really
is growing together. The challenge (will be) whether our Constitution ... fits
into the governing documents of other nations."
Editorial, supra note 3, at A12; see also Stephen Henderson, Call This Trio . . . the
Supremes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 22, 2005, at A9; Guy Taylor, Justices Argue International
Law, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at A4; Candid Camera with Supreme Court Justices: In
Rare Q&A, Three Talk of Political Pressures, International Law, MSNBC, Apr. 22, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7598231/; Hope Yen, O'Connor Dismisses Ado over Int'l Law,
S.F. GATE, Apr. 21, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cg?f=/n/a/2005/04/
21/national/w190519D86.DTL. A video of the conversation is available online: U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Interview with Tim Russert (C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 21,
2005), available at http://c-span.org/Search/advancedsearchform.asp (search for "Su-
preme CourtJustices Interview").
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It cannot be dismissed that the role of international law in
domestic jurisprudence is increasing in its application, contro-
versy, and danger. Lower courts will undoubtedly struggle with
these recent decisions as they attempt to decide which "law" can
be appropriately applied.72
As Judge Robert Bork has opined, the Framers may be turn-
ing over in their graves: "The most ominous aspect of Roper...
is the Court majority's reliance upon foreign decisions and unra-
tified treaties .... If the meaning of a document over 200 years
old can be affected by the current state of world opinion, James
Madison and his colleagues labored in vain."73 It is a Constitu-
tion the courts should be expounding," not other people's laws.
B. The Alien Tort Statute
Citation for interpretation is not the only means by which
international and foreign law has entered the judicial decision-
72. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) ("The United
States has at times demonstrated a certain unwillingness to permit international law to
decide domestic disputes .... This is particularly remarkable, given how recently the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the importance of international law in defining the lib-
erties protected by the Bill of Rights."); United States v. Quinones, 2004 WL 1234044, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("As a district court, moreover, this Court must scrupulously adhere
to the teachings of the higher federal courts; and the Supreme Court, which has not
been unmindful of the impact of international law in this context, as elsewhere.., has
not indicated the slightest support for the notion that international law bars the death
penalty per se."); Pillsbury Co. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2005) ("When the United States has departed from international norms, con-
structions of U.S. statutes by foreign governments are wholly irrelevant.... [W]hy the
Court would be swayed by the position of foreign governments on U.S. law is unclear."),
vacated, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005). As Kenneth Anderson notes, there
is no doubt that this series of cases, especially Roper, will empower, embolden, or inspire
all federal courts to consider citation to foreign authorities:
None of this is confined, of course, solely to Supreme Court cases. On
the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that, given the open invitation
of Roper, the practice will rapidly spread throughout the federal courts. Why
shouldn't it? ... The practice will now spread like an internet virus across the
legal system, under pressure from both plaintiffs and defendants, liberals and
conservatives, activists and those answering activists. Once one side has
deployed them in litigation, the other side will have to respond to them and,
crucially, find something to counterbalance them from the same corpusjuris of
foreign and international materials .... Roper tells U.S. judges, in effect, that
they should strive not to be the Ugly Judicial American.
Anderson, supra note 57, at 49.
73. Bork, supra note 61, at 17.
74. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.") (emphases in the original).
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making process. One significant development in the past
twenty-five years has manifested itself in the use of the Alien Tort
Statute ("ATS") (or Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") ).75 Old but
little known for most of its life since passed as part of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789,76 the Alien Tort Statute has become the princi-
ple mechanism for injecting international norms and human
rights into U.S. courts. Lawsuits under the ATS have been filed
exponentially against Nation-States, State actors, and even pri-
vate individuals or corporations for supposed violations of inter-
national law. The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. 7 7
It remained almost entirely dormant for almost 200 years,
but now the ATS is playing an exponentially significant role in
the application of international law in U.S. courts. There have
been five principal waves in the evolution of ATS litigation. This
section discusses the most significant cases in the ATS waves of
evolution. The first wave was disuse and dormancy; the second
was the acceptance of liability under the ATS for official State
acts, including its recognition as a statute providing both juris-
diction and a cause of action and liability evidenced by noncom-
pliance with customary international law outputs; and the third
was the movement toward an acceptance that quasi-State and in-
deed private individuals could be liable for violations of custom-
ary international law. The fourth wave in ATS jurisprudence in-
volves suits against private individuals and corporations. The
fifth wave involves the first guidance from the U.S. Supreme
Court and its decision that contributes to the debate over the use
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and
Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 587-91 (2002) (explaining that "Alien Tort Statute"
("ATS") is preferable to "Alien Tort Claims Act" ("ATCA") if one believes that § 1350
does not create a cause of action).
76. Judge Henry Friendly has described the Act as an "old but little used section"
that is "a kind of legal Lohengrin; ... no one seems to know whence it came." IIT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The original Act, enacted by the First Congress, read: "The
district courts ... shall have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789).
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of international law, but fails to truly clarify the role of U.S.
courts vis-A-vis international and foreign sources of authority.
Wave one was that of dormancy. The ATS remained essen-
tially unaccessed-or "dormant" in the parlance of literature in
this field-for almost 200 years.78
The second wave emerged in 1980 when the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.79
Filartiga set the stage for the use of the ATS for civil litigation
based on human rights and other international norms.8 ° Dolly
Filartiga, a citizen of the Republic of Paraguay, sued Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala, formerly an Inspector General of Police of
Paraguay, for allegedly kidnapping, torturing, and killing her
brother while in office.8 ' The alleged actions took place in Para-
guay.8 2 The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.8" The Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded. It held that deliberate torture by State officials violates
international law and that alleging such torture creates jurisdic-
tion under the ATS. 84  The court found that the ATS created
jurisdiction and provided a cause of action.
78. See Mark K. Moller, Old Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: The Alien Tort Statute and Fed-
eral Common Law in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in CATO Sup. CT. REv. 209 (2004) (noting
that the ATS was, "until recently, long-dormant"); see also Hari M. Osofsky, Environmen-
tal Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational
Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 335, 345 (1997) ("From its passage as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 until Filartiga, almost two hundred years later, the Alien
Tort Statute virtually lay dormant. .. ").
79. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For general discussions of
the case and its approach, see, for example, Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. IN-r'L L.J. 53 (1981); Dean Rusk, A Comment on Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 311 (1981); Louis B. Sohn, Torture as a Violation
ofthe Law of Nations, 11 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 307 (1981); Gabriel M. Wilner, Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala: Comments on Sources of Human Rights Law and Means of Redress for Violations
of Human Rights, 11 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 317 (1981); Farooq Hassan, Note, A Conflict
of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 250, 255 (1983);
Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The
Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163 (1985); and Mark P. Jacob-
sen, Comment, 28 U.S. C. 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in Paraguay?, 69 GEO. L.J. 833,
834, 849 (1981).
80. Judge Charles Robb of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit described
the Filartiga approach as "judicially will[ing] that statute a new life." Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Robb, J., concurring).
81. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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The Filartiga court held that "deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the
nationality of the parties."85  Filartiga established that modem
concepts of "international law" were synonymous with the phrase
"law of nations" in the statute. The court also held that interna-
tional law is an evolving concept to be ascertained by the
courts.8 6 The Second Circuit held that courts ascertaining the
law of Nations "must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today. "87
The Filartiga decision inspired multiple lawsuits against
States and State actors.88 Courts struggled to discern the proper
role of international law and the definition thereof. For exam-
ple, the D.C. Circuit departed from the Filartiga approach to in-
ternational law in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.89 Representa-
tives of persons killed in a civilian bus in Israel, along with the
injured survivors of the attack, sued the Libyan Arab Republic,
the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Information
Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Pal-
estine Congress of North America.9 ° The plaintiffs claimed the
defendants committed multiple tortious acts in violation of inter-
national law.91
Although there were three separate opinions, the D.C. Cir-
cuit panel agreed unanimously that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' causes of action. 92 Judge Edwards, adhering
85. Id.
86. See id. at 881.
87. Id.
88. E.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (ordering
Argentine plaintiffs to amend complaints of official torture, and noting that ATS pro-
vides "not merely jurisdiction, but a cause of action ... arising by recognition of certain
'international torts'").
89. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). For a discussion of the case, see Debra A. Harvey,
Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply "Histori-
cal Trivia"?, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 341, 349-52 (1988); and Kenneth Marc Schneider,
Note, Hanoch Tel-Oren: The Retreat from Filartiga, 4 CARDozo L. REv. 665 passim
(1983).
90. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1981).
For a discussion of the district court opinion, see Eileen Rose Pollock, Terrorism as a Tort
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FoRDHam INT'L L.J. 236 passim (1982).
91. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 544 (district court decision).
92. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
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to Filartiga, contended that violations of the law of Nations are a
narrow category reserved to "a handful of heinous actions-each
of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms, 93
and that the alleged actions in this case did not trigger such ju-
risdiction.9 4 However, Edwards noted that the judiciary should
exercise jurisdiction in cases where a proper cause of action satis-
fies the requirements of the ATS.95
Judge Robb's concurrence was based primarily on the politi-
cal question doctrine. He argued that an exercise ofjurisdiction
would improperly involve the judiciary in foreign affairs-an
area beyond the province and expertise of the judiciary and one
interfering with the province of the political branches.9 6 In addi-
tion, Judge Robb rejected the Filartiga formulation for ascertain-
ing international law under the ATS.9 v Robb opined that:
Courts ought not to serve as debating clubs for professors will-
ing to argue over what is or what is not an accepted violation
of the law of nations. Yet this appears to be the clear result if
we allow plaintiffs the opportunity to proceed under § 1350.
... The typical judge or jury would be swamped in citations to
various distinguished journals of international legal studies,
but would be left with little more than a numbing sense of
how varied is the world of public international "law."98
International law was too indeterminate, and if the sovereign law
making authority-Congress-has not given the judiciary gui-
dance on the incorporation of international law, Judge Robb
opined that the judiciary had no cognizance under the statute.9 9
Judge Bork, also concurring in a separate opinion, found
that the ATS provided only jurisdiction at best and did not pro-
vide a separate, private cause of action for violations of interna-
tional law. 00 Judge Bork proclaimed that even if international
93. Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 776; see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365
(E.D. La. 1997) (accepting a broader scope of the law of Nations, which included action
by private individuals, but dismissing for failure to state a claim under the ATS upon
which relief can be granted).
95. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 827 ("We ought not to cobble together for [the ATS] a modem mis-
sion on the vague idea that international law develops over the years. Law may evolve,
but statutes ought not to mutate.").
98. Id. at 827.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
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law provides rules of decision, it does not automatically provide
causes of action. 01 When there exists "sufficient controversy of
a politically sensitive nature about the content of any relevant
international legal principles" implicated in the litigation, Bork
proclaimed that it is improper to adjudicate those claims in light
of separation of powers principles. 10 2 Finally, Judge Bork ex-
tended his opinion to argue that the meaning of "law of nations"
in the ATS should be limited to the types of offenses understood
to constitute the whole of international law at the Founding." 3
Wave three is identified by the 1995 decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzic. °4
The plaintiffs in Kadic were Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 10 They alleged various atrocities including rape,
torture, and summary executions by the Bosnian-Serb military
forces. 106 The suit was brought against Radovan Karadzic, in his
capacity as the President of the Bosnian-Serb faction. The dis-
trict court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. 10 7 The Second Circuit reversed this ruling,'0 8 and further
101. See id. at 811.
102. Id. at 808. Judge Bork further stated that "[a]djudication of those claims
would require the analysis of international legal principles that are anything but clearly
defined and that are the subject of controversy touching 'sharply on national nerves.'"
Id. at 805 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1963)).
103. See id.
104. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). Judge Newman highlighted the odd nature of the case in
his opinion: "Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn that victims of
atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb
forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan." Id. at 236. Several case notes
and articles have been published on the Kadic opinion. See, e.g.,Judith Hippler Bello et
al., International Decision, 90 Am.J. IMr'L L. 658 (1996); David S. Bloch, Dangers of Right-
eousness: Unintended Consequences of Kadic v. Karadzic, 4 TuL.SA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35
(1996) (arguing that, while international law litigation in U.S. courts is generally good,
Kadic itself "muddies international law, weakens American diplomacy and strengthens
the very outlaws it is intended to attack"); Pamala Brondos, Note, International Law-
The Use of the Torture Victim Protection Act as an Enforcement Mechanism, 32 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 221 (1997); Amy E. Eckert, Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Whose International Law?, 25
DENY. J. INTr'L L. & PoL'Y 173 (1996) (concluding Kadic went too far); Alan Frederick
Enslen, Note, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit Significantly Expands the Scope of the
Alien Tort Claim Act with Its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REv. 695 (1997);
Justin Lu, Note, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531 (1997).
105. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
106. See id. at 236-37.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 251.
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expanded the role of international law in U.S. jurisprudence.'0 9
The Second Circuit held that the ATS applies to actions by State
actors or even private individuals that are in violation of the most
egregious portions of law identified as customary international
law."' Official State action, the court stated, is not essential for
a cognizable violation of the law of Nations to exist."' It cob-
bled together a laundry list of authorities to define the norms of
contemporary international law that the court felt justified im-
posing liability." 2 Significant cases in other circuits followed.11
Wave four followed cases throughout the 1980s and early
1990s where several suits were brought against multinational cor-
porations for alleged violations of customary international
law." 4  These suits were largely unsuccessful." 5  The progres-
sion, however, continued in 1997 when a federal district court in
California issued its decision in the case of Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
upholding subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS based on
allegations that an U.S. oil company, acting allegedly in concert
with the Myanmar/Burmese government, committed various
civil and human rights abuses.' 16
In a 2002 opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
109. See Charles F. Marshall, Reframing the Alien Tort Act After Kadic v. Karadzic, 21
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 591, 597 (1996).
110. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 238-39.
113. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving
political opponents of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines who brought ATS
action seeking to recover from Marcos' estate for damages caused by alleged human-
rights abuses occurring during Marcos' tenure in office); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d
844 (11 th Cir. 1996) (involving ATS claims made by former prisoners in Ethiopia, suing
official of former Ethiopian government who was allegedly responsible for allegations
of torture and other cruel acts); Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Human Rights Litigation), 978 F.2d 493, 501-03 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
972 (1993) (involving Philippine citizen who brought action against daughter of former
Philippine President, asserting wrongful death claim in connection with death of her
Philippine son caused by torture).
114. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988)
(involving British national who brought action under ATS against various businesses for
his imprisonment and torture in Saudi Arabia); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775
F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting dismissal motion on jurisdictional grounds by
Delaware corporation accused by U.K corporation and its U.S. agent of violating ATS
and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
115. See supra note 114.
116. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that civil rights abuses by Bur-
mese government did not fall within commercial activity exception to Foreign Sover-
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Ninth Circuit, the circuit court reversed in part a decision by the
district court to grant a motion for summary judgment in favor
of Unocal. 1 7 There, the circuit court held that sufficient evi-
dence existed to support the plaintiffs' allegations-accusing
Unocal of aiding and abetting forced labor, murder, rape, and
torture, committed by the Myanmar/Burmese government-to
allow the case to proceed to trial. The court again cited numer-
ous international sources to reach their conclusion. It also rea-
soned that international law was superior to the use of domestic
law:
Application of international law-rather than the law of
Myanmar, California state law, or our federal common law-
is also favored by a consideration of the factors listed in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969). First,
"the needs of the . . . international system . . ." are better
served by applying international rather than national law.
Second, "the relevant policies of the forum" cannot be ascer-
tained by referring-as the concurrence does-to one out-of-
circuit decision which happens to favor federal common law
and ignoring other decisions which have favored other law,
including international law .... Finally, "the basic polic[y] un-
derlying the particular field of law" is to provide tort remedies for
violations of international law. This goal is furthered by the applica-
tion of international law, even when the international law in ques-
tion is criminal law but is similar to domestic tort law .... 118
The court's holding was an endorsement of a substantial role for
international law in federal court adjudication.
After the original 1997 Unocal decision, lawsuits against pri-
vate corporations by plaintiffs attempting to invoke international
law have proliferated."1 9 Of course, these cases have faced
mixed success, yet they demonstrate an increasing willingness by
U.S. courts to adopt international standards, or at least consider
doing so. They also demonstrate an awareness by plaintiffs and
their attorneys of that new pool of potential ammunition in liti-
gation.
eign Immunities Act and that there was jurisdiction over human rights claims against oil
company under ATS).
117. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
118. Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., Robert Vosper, Conduct Unbecoming, CORP. LEGAL TiMES, Oct. 2002, at
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Wave five-the current wave of ATS litigation-came in
June 2004 when, for the first time in 215 years, the Supreme
Court made significant pronouncements on the interpretation
and application of the ATS. The two relevant opinions were
Rasul v. Bush120 and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.121
In Rasul v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded with-
out significant commentary that the district court below had ju-
risdiction to hear ATS claims brought by individuals in U.S. mili-
tary custody at Guantanamo Bay. 1 2 2 As Justice Scalia (joined by
then ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas) pointed out in
dissent, however, the ATS controversy was not even raised in the
appeal for the Court's review.123 Although it discusses the ATS,
the Court added little to our understanding of its role.
Far more interesting, yet far from fully enlightening, was the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain-in-
120. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
121. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
122. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483.
123. Justice Scalia noted:
[The ATS jurisdictional issue] is not presented to us. The ATS, while invoked
below, was repudiated as a basis for jurisdiction by all petitioners, either in
their petition for certiorari, in their briefing before this Court, or at oral argu-
ment.
Id. at 504 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The lower court opinion was
more interesting. In March 2003, Judge Raymond Randolph of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals wrote a concurring opinion in the lower court opinion, Al Odah v. United
States, which seriously questioned the expansive reach of recent ATS judicial recogni-
tion. See 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Al Odah (sub nom. Rasul) involved peti-
tions for habeas corpus relief by detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that the D.C.
Circuit ultimately denied. See id. at 1145. The detainees premised part of their claims
on the ATS and international law. The D.C. Circuit's majority opinion did not address
the ATS or its proper interpretation, but Judge Randolph's concurring opinion did.
His opinion constitutes one of very few judicial opinions to question the legitimacy of
modern ATS application, and will undoubtedly serve as motivation for more critical
judicial examination of the ATS in forthcoming decisions. Judge Randolph questioned
many of the premises upon which ATS jurisprudential expansion has been based for
the past twenty-three years, and opined that "[ t] o have federal courts discover [custom-
ary international law] among the writings of those considered experts in international
law and in treaties the Senate may or may not have ratified is anti-democratic and at
odds with principles of separation of powers." Id. at 1148. In a similar interesting devel-
opment in United States v. Yousef, the Second Circuit also called into question, and,
some argue, took a newly restrictive view of the appropriate sources that courts may
look to when attempting to define customary international law. See United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 passim (2d Cir. 2003) (holding inter alia that the United States
could exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over defendants who were charged
with attempted plane bombing in Southeast Asia based on the protective principle of
customary international law, among other treaty-based and U.S. law).
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volving the abduction and transportation to the United States of
a Mexican national, Alvarez, at the instigation of U.S. Drug En-
forcement Agency ("DEA") officials. 124 Among other claims, Al-
varez sued the United States and the abductor, Sosa, under the
ATS. 1 25 The U.S. Supreme Court decided that Alvarez was not
entitled to recover damages from Sosa under the ATS. 126 This
was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court had substantively de-
cided an ATS claim.
The Supreme Court held principally that "we agree the
[ATS] is in terms only jurisdictional, [but] we think that at the
time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to
hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of na-
tions and recognized at common law."'1 27 Thus, although the
majority opinion recognizes that the ATS is purely jurisdictional,
it acknowledges that federal courts may recognize some interna-
tional norms as enforceable law in certain situations. The Court
endorsed a discretion-based framework without much guidance
to lower courts addressing ATS cases. Indeed, this may empower
lower court judges to exercise their discretion to serve their own
personal interpretations of which international norms should or
should not be recognized as "enforceable." Although the Su-
preme Court demanded "caution," it nonetheless accepted the
ideas adopted in earlier wave cases that international law is part
of "our law," that international law evolves, and that there are a
number of sources that courts should reference to identify cus-
tomary international law, including the works of jurists and
scholars in the field (persons often biased by the self-perpetua-
tion of their field). 128
The primary holding of the Supreme Court in Sosa was that
the ATS is a jurisdictional statute but causes of action for viola-
tions of "international law" may still be considered:
124. See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
125. See id. at 697-98.
126. See id. at 711-13.
127. Id. at 711.
128. The Court articulated the following guideline for evaluating ATS claims:
Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to juris-
diction under § 1350, we are persuaded that federal courts should not recog-
nize private claims under federal common law for violations of any interna-
tional law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized na-
tions than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.
Id. at 732.
2006]
536 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:507
In sum, although the ATS is ajurisdictional statute creat-
ing no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from
the historical materials is that the statute was intended to
have practical effect the moment it became law. The jurisdic-
tional grant is best read as having been enacted on the under-
standing that the common law would provide a cause of ac-
tion for the modest number of international law violations
with a potential for personal liability at the time .... We
assume, too, that no development in the two centuries from
the enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modem line of
cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala has categorically
precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the
law of nations as an element of common law.
129
The Supreme Court set certain standards for bringing claims
under the ATS, but rejected the ATS as a general vehicle for
"international law" claims.
The Supreme Court nonetheless called for great caution in
light of the potential for international lawjurisprudence to inter-
fere with foreign affairs responsibilities of the elected branches:
"Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the
violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of
adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be under-
taken, if at all, with great caution." 1 0 Yet, the majority explained
that the courts cannot completely disassociate themselves from
the world community: "It would take some explaining to say
now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any
international norm intended to protect individuals,"'' but "the
judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus
open to a narrow class of international norms today."' 13
2
Despite "caution," some words of the Sosa majority seemed
to have no problem with, and in fact endorsed, the expansionist
evolution of ATS jurisprudence described in the first four waves:
We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the First
Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all ca-
129. Id. at 724-25 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 728. The Court further noted that 'jurisdiction was originally under-
stood to be available to enforce a small number of international norms that a federal
court could properly recognize as within the common law enforceable without further
statutory authority." Id. at 729.
131. Id. at 730.
132. Id. at 729.
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pacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply
because the common law might lose some metaphysical
cachet on the road to modern realism. Later Congresses
seem to have shared our view. The position we take today has
been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since
the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala .... 133
In the end, however, the Sosa Court found Alvarez did not have a
claim for unlawful abduction in violation of international law.' 34
In Sosa, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but
opined separately (joined by then Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas) to contest the idea of federal common law in-
cluding international law as "nonsense on stilts":
In modern international human rights litigation of the sort
that has proliferated since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a federal
court must first create the underlying federal command. But
"the fact that a rule has been recognized as [customary inter-
national law], by itself, is not an adequate basis for viewing
that rule as part of federal common law. 1 35
Justice Scalia emphasized the general rejection of federal "com-
mon law" since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
1 36
Justice Scalia also questioned the interference with Con-
gress and foreign relations associated with judicial recognition of
customary international law claims.13 v He opined that asking
133. Id.
134. See id. at 738. The Court explained:
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the
present, imperfect world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding
customary rule having the specificity we require. Creating a private cause of
action to further that aspiration would go beyond any residual common law
discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.
Id.
135. Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
136. Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
137. See id. at 747. Justice Scalia stated the following:
[M]any attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new
norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy conse-
quences ....
•.. Several times, indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts
the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law ....
These considerations are not, as the Court thinks them, reasons why
courts must be circumspect in use of their extant general-common-law-making
powers. They are reasons why courts cannot possibly be thought to have been
given, and should not be thought to possess, federal-common-law-making pow-
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judges to define international laws applicable in U.S. courts
threatens democratic principles:
To be sure, today's opinion does not itself precipitate a
direct confrontation with Congress by creating a cause of ac-
tion that Congress has not. But it invites precisely that action
by the lower courts .... In holding open the possibility that
judges may create rights where Congress has not authorized
them to do so, the Court countenances judicial occupation of
a domain that belongs to the people's representatives.' 3 8
Justice Scalia's concurrence reflects the concerns that judicial in-
vocation of international law allows activism subjectivity contrary
to rule of law and democratic values. Justice Scalia continued his
disagreement by arguing that judges violate the separation of
powers when adopting foreign or international laws: "We Ameri-
cans have a method for making the laws that are over us.... For
over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been
usurping this lawmaking power by converting what they regard
as norms of international law into American law.' 139 Much like
citing to foreign and international law for purposes of interpret-
ing U.S. laws, opening the gates through causes of action based
on such sources presents significant problems and dangers.
II. THE DANGERS UNDERL YING JUDICIAL REFERENCE TO
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS
The invocation of foreign and international law, whether as
supporting precedent or as the bases for liability theories, repre-
sents a disturbing development in the recent interpretation and
development of federal law.1 4° It also deviates from the tradi-
ers with regard to the creation of private federal causes of action for violations
of customary international law.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia further emphasized that "[tihe Second Circuit,
which started the Judiciary down the path the Court today tries to hedge in, is a good
indicator of where that path leads us: directly into confrontation with the political
branches." Id. at 748 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
138. Id. at 747.
139. Id. at 750.
140. See Michael M. Uhlmann, The Supreme Court Rules, FIRST THINGS: MONTHLYJ.
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, Oct. 2003, at 45. But see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globaliza-
tion, 40 VA.J. INT'L L. 1103, 1123 (2000) ("Judges are globalizing. So what?"); Tushnet,
supra note 2, at 267 ("[A]rguments presented against making non-U.S. law a rule of
decision in U.S. cases are no more than replays of arguments about statutory and consti-
tutional interpretation in the purely domestic context."); Sanford Levinson, Has the Su-
preme Court Gone Too Far? A Symposium, COMMENT., Oct. 2003, at 37, 39 ("As for looking
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tional role of governance and the judicial role in the U.S. sys-
tem."' The practice, as Bork has contended, "comes pretty
close to accepting foreign control of the American Constitu-
tion."14 2 With such implications, judges should refrain from
looking outside U.S. borders and recognize that it is U.S. law
they are interpreting and applying.
A. Constitutional Concerns
There is a fundamental constitutional objection to the use
of international and foreign law in U.S. judicial decisionmaking.
Except for a few discrete categories recognized in Article III,
there is no general constitutional grant for U.S. courts to apply
or even recognize foreign or international law. 4' The judiciary
is a branch of limited jurisdiction and authority utilize interna-
tional law-defined by Article III. Moreover, attempts by Article
III courts to do so necessarily interfere with the constitutional
prerogatives of the elected branches (the Executive and Con-
gress) and thereby raises serious separation of powers issues.
If the United States is to have an independent but limited
judiciary, the courts must feel constitutionally constrained from
searching for, and then applying, extraterritorial sources for pur-
ported authority in reaching decisions. Non-adherence to such
constraints cannot be justified when the United States is a coun-
to transnational and international norms in trying to discern what such notions as due
process or equal protection might mean, I see no harm in this.").
141. Consider, for example, Judge Bork's description of the judicial role:
The democratic integrity of law. .. depends entirely upon the degree to
which its processes are legitimate. Ajudge who announces a decision must be
able to demonstrate that he began from recognized legal principles and rea-
soned in an intellectually coherent and politically neutral way to his result.
Those who would politicize the law offer the public, and the judiciary, the
temptation of results without regard to democratic legitimacy.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 (1990).
142. Bork, supra note 61, at 17 ("What is really alarming about Roper and other
cases citing foreign law (six Justices now engage in that practice) is that the Court, in
tacit coordination with foreign courts, is moving toward a global bill of rights."). Profes-
sor Berkowitz reaches a similar conclusion:
How can the Constitution remain the supreme law of the land if, as [Professor
Anne-Marie] Slaughter counsels, American judges look beyond and above the
Constitution to an increasingly authoritative "global constitutional jurispru-
dence" and if office holders in all three branches "also see themselves as repre-
senting a larger transnational or even global constituency"?
Berkowitz, supra note 4, at 78.
143. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 75; Kochan, supra note 11.
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try of limited, defined, and enumerated powers with elected
branches that create laws and a judiciary that is limited to inter-
preting them.
B. Sovereignty Concerns
A Nation has the right to make its own laws and to define
the means by which those laws are created and interpreted.144
In the United States, laws are not created by the judiciary, but
instead, by collaboration between the elected branches. "Sover-
eignty denotes independence. A sovereign [State] is one that
acknowledges no superior power over its own government." '145
Indeed, sovereignty was the basis for the revolution and the in-
dependence of the United States.14 6
Yet the idea of sovereignty is under attack in today's soci-
ety-in part by judges who rely on extraterritorial authority.
144. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 133
(June 27) (stating that "the whole of international law" is based upon the "fundamental
principle of sovereignty"); see alsoJack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations The-
o7y, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. REv. 959, 985 (2000).
145. RABRIN, supra note 19, at 2; see also id. at 101 ("America's first duty must be to
protect its own democracy and the rights and resources of its own people-by safe-
guarding its own sovereignty."); Ronald A. Brand, Sovereignty, the State, the Individual,
and the International Legal System in the Twenty-First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
Rev. 279 (2002). See generally JEREMY A. RABRIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY. WHY THE
WORLD SHOULD WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 291 (2004) (noting that the twenti-
eth-century "application[s] of municipal law in municipal courts" against sovereign ac-
tors have eroded the concept of "sovereign immunity"); Rabkin, supra note 44, at 459
("Sovereignty is not the answer to every political question any more than individual
rights are the answer to every personal challenge.... In moral terms, sovereignty is the
first line of national defense.").
146. As Congressman Bob Barr explains:
The Founders realized that Americans possess nothing more indispensa-
ble than national sovereignty. This realization was the fundamental rationale
for the revolution against England-freedom to self-govern. To the detriment
of the country and its posterity, this sacrosanct freedom has been slowly and
methodically eroded since the inception of the United Nations. Today, nary a
thought is given when international organizations, like the [United Nations],
attempt to enforce their myopic vision of a one-world government upon
America, while trumping our Constitution in the process. Moreover, many in
our own government willfully or ignorantly cede constitutionally guaranteed
rights and freedoms to the international community. The hour has arrived in
which we must soberly question our involvement in global organizations and
our implementation of internal policies that directly threaten our precious
sovereignty-the very sovereignty that so many have shed blood protecting.
Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An Increasingly
Difficult Task, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 299, 323-24 (2002).
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Some prominent authorities lead the fight against its sanctity:
"In the spring of 1994, Louis Henkin, then the president of the
American Society for International Law, urged that the word
'sovereignty' should be 'banished from polite or educated soci-
ety.' "147
Judges who recognize this concept of sovereignty clearly
overstep their role in the United States when they resort to "law"
that has been developed outside the constitutional processes for
law through U.S. institutions. 148 As one author states:
The case against transnational law is sometimes made
purely in terms of sovereignty: giving force to transnational
rules laid down by non-American decision makers surrenders
U.S. sovereignty. The reasoning appears self-evident: sover-
eignty as a "final say" is a sine qua non of statehood, and it is
indivisible. To the extent that a state is subject to law made
elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty and, perhaps, in some
deep way, its right to call itself a "state."149
It is primarily a matter of control.15 A Nation should have the
freedom to control the development of its own laws.'51 The
elected branches, which develop U.S. law, lose that control if
147. Rabkin, supra note 44, at 435 (quoting Notes from the President, AM. Soc'v INT'L
L. NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1993, at 1, 6).
148. See Rabkin, supra note 44, at 440 ("The initial point of sovereignty is to put
the exercise of physical coercion under constitutional control.").
149. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational
Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 1992-93 (2004); see also NEIL MAC-
CORMICK, QUESTIONING SovEREIGNTv. LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MONWEALTH 127 (1999) ("Sovereign power is ... territorial in character, and is power
not subject to limitation by higher or coordinate power."); Connell, supra note 2, at 61
("[R]eliance upon foreign authorities raises significant questions not only about the
resulting impact upon our federal system of government, but also upon our national
sovereignty."). F.H. Hinsley writes:
[A]t the beginning, at any rate, the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there
is a final and absolute political authority in the political community; and every-
thing that needs to be added to complete the definition is added if this state-
ment is continued in the following words: "and no final and absolute author-
ity exists elsewhere.
F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 25-26 (2d ed. 1986).
150. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 527, 542 (2003) (discussing "[tihe [a]biding [i]mportance of [s]overeignty").
151. See Drezner, supra note 2, at 323 ("[Slovereignty endows a government with
the power to regulate the affairs of a well-defined territory and its resident population
without interference from organizations or individuals external to the jurisdiction. In
other words, a sovereign state has the final say on the rule of law within its territory.").
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judges are able to exhort extraterritorial and extra-constitutional
sources for the determination of legally applicable standards.
The invocation of international or foreign law invades the
lawmaking authority of the elected branches on many counts. If
Congress has not chosen to reduce a norm to legislation it is
presumptuous for the courts to pretend they know better. The
boundaries of sovereignty are weakened when courts can rely on
non-domestic sources in reaching decisions.
The consequences of such intrusions on sovereign control
should not be understated. If, indeed, sovereignty means the
right to national autonomy, exclusion of foreign law is essential
to the preservation of national identity and independence.
C. The Cocktail Party: Rule of Law, Selectivity, and
Judicial Activism Concerns
The development of rules in the United States is meant to
be tough-bicameralism and presentment, for example, is one
means by which the production of law is controlled. Such con-
trols do not necessarily exist in the production of foreign and
international law, making them more suspect and, in a system
based in the rule of law, inappropriate for judicial application.
When a judge is defining law, reference to laws generated
according to U.S. constitutional processes is a closed set. Ac-
cepting judicial ability to search the world allows judges to select
from an open set, creating the risk of selection bias.152 Outcome
determinative judges will select what best supports their desired
result. It is like giving a referee in America's National Football
League ("NFL") the power to selectively apply Australian rules
when it suits him during the game.
This brings the Article back to the cocktail party. If the
crowd at the party is the whole world, judges have a nearly infi-
nite number of guests they can find to infuse and support their
decisions. It is an intoxicating opportunity for judicial activists.
As stated previously, injecting international and foreign sources
in judicial decision-making can be described as the same as en-
152. See Connell, supra note 2, at 74 ("Justice Stevens' reliance on foreign opinion
is highly selective, citing only opinion that favors his desired result, and none that might
point to a different conclusion .... These examples are a further illustration of the
antidemocratic nature of many foreign laws, as well as the irrelevance of the European
Union's official opinion.").
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tering a crowded cocktail party and avoiding all the unknown
people, disliked people, annoying people, or boring people, and
scoping the scene to maneuver toward your friends.15 3 With for-
eign and international law as potential and acceptable sources of
authority, judges have a large crowd to pick from and a large
pool to ignore or reject. Determining which countries matter,
what principles matter, and what constitutes "authority" is diffi-
cult, and-when decided by a judge looking beyond U.S. bor-
ders-constitutes a preferential decision not necessarily en-
dorsed by U.S. lawmakers.1 5 4
There is no reliable discerning principle for the selection of
applicable and appropriate extra-constitutional laws to the inter-
pretation of U.S. law.1 55 The concomitant effect is that the citi-
zenry has no certain, predictable, and identifiable means for un-
derstanding what the "law" is that governs their actions when ref-
erence to, or reliance on, extra-constitutional sources of law are
allowed.
If judges can cite foreign or international authorities in
their interpretation of U.S. law or in the definition of liabilities
153. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring) (quot-
ing Judge Leventhal on the subjective process of using legislative history in statutory
interpretation).
154. See BoRK, supra note 1, at 137. Bork further states:
Internationalism is illegitimate when courts decide to interpret their own
constitutions with guidance from the decisions of foreign courts under their
national constitutions. The American Constitution, for example, was framed
and amended in light of specific American history, culture, and aspirations. It
has a meaning given to it not only by judicial decisions but by the practices of
national and state governments. It is not apparent when an American court
should take guidance from the decisions of the courts of Jamaica, India and
Zimbabwe, reflecting their very different histories, cultures, aspirations and
practices.
Id.
155. Recent literature has identified this threat of unrestrained application of ex-
tra-constitutional laws:
But the damage goes beyond that to American sovereignty. No principle
of American law explains the Court's reliance on foreign law to interpret the
United States Constitution. Moreover, the Court articulated no principle for
when or how foreign law ought to be used in the construction of the Constitu-
tion, leaving open the prospect of its being used for any purpose, at any time.
Connell, supra note 2, at 71; see also C. Donald Johnson, Jr., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A
Contribution to the Development of Customay International Law by a Domestic Court, 11 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 335, 336-37 (1981) (arguing "[t]he difficulty of the task [of defining
international law] is made more obvious by the wide variance among academic special-
ists in the field in approaching the sources of international law" and describing the
"often nebulous law represented by the usage and practice of nations").
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in tort litigation, there is a tremendous amount of leeway to in-
ject personal preferences at the expense of adherence to estab-
lished law. 156 The rule of law requires that judicial authority be
insulated from such preferential powers. 157
This debate is not simply a political issue. If liberals can
invoke foreign or international law to advance their preferences,
conservatives can do the same. 58 In both cases, this attempt to
legitimize preferences is beyond the judicial role.
Furthermore, rule of law issues are affected not simply by
selection bias but by the non-U.S. nature of production of for-
eign and international sources. In other words, these "laws"
were not created under the strictures of the U.S. Constitution.
As such, they lack formal elements or intentions as enforceable
law.
Most often, customary international law outputs are in-
tended only as aspirational or symbolic, rather than drafted as
enforceable legal obligations or with the intent of creating liabil-
ity.' 59 If these outputs are used as evidence of enforceable cus-
156. Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, M. Edward Whelan III testified:
No Justice has articulated, and there is not, any legitimate basis for the
Supreme Court to rely on contemporary foreign laws or decisions in determin-
ing the meaning of provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, it is clear that
there is no principle that any Justice has devised or will adopt that will explain
why it would be proper to look to some contemporary foreign and interna-
tional legal materials, but not others, to construe the Constitution in some
instances but not in others. The six Justices who nonetheless resort to these
materials do so because they embrace an essentially lawless-i.e., uncon-
strained-view of their own role as Justices.
Whelan Testimony, supra note 12, at 26.
157. See, e.g., LEONARD LEvy, AGAINST THE LAw xiii (1974) ("[R]esult-orientedjuris-
prudence [is a] judicial monstrosity that gains nothing when the Court reaches a just
result merely because of its identification with underdog litigants.").
158. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 11 ("For the Court to invoke this treaty as pur-
ported support for its own contrary judgment about American values is perverse-and
should give liberals, who believe in democratic principles, no reason to cheer.").
159. See Kochan, supra note 11, at 182-87; see, e.g., Rusk, supra note 79, at 313
("The simple fact is that the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] was not
drafted or proclaimed to serve as law."); id. (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 494, 19
DEP'T ST. BULL. 749, 751 (1948), which quoted Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, who stated when presenting the Declaration to the
U.N. General Assembly, that "[ilt is not and does not purport to be a statement of law
or of legal obligation. [It is] a common standard of achievement .. "). Despite this,
courts in cases like Filartiga and Kadic relied on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other customary international law outputs crafted under similar means and
with intentions.
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tomary international law obligations and liabilities or as author-
ity for the interpretation of U.S. law, courts mangle and inappro-
priately manipulate their purpose and character. 160  Indeed,
allowing judges to use elusive and diffuse principles of human
rights to discover applicable international law is beyond their ca-
pacity and beyond the power committed to them by the Consti-
tution.
Finally, in terms of activism, reliance on extraterritorial
"law" is a run around Congress's ability, prerogative, and respon-
sibility to define U.S. law. 161 Indeed, some cases have relied on
certain international or foreign "laws" despite direct evidence of
Congress's intent that such documents not create legal obliga-
tions or liabilities and are not drafted as "law."1 62 When courts
have discretion to look beyond the United States for the founda-
tions of their decisions, serious dangers arise to the rule of law
160. In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork stated that "[a]djudication of those claims would re-
quire the analysis of international legal principles that are anything but clearly defined
and that are the subject of controversy touching 'sharply on national nerves.'" Hanoch
v. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1963)).
161. See, e.g., Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41
VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1255 (1988) ("[T]he Constitution indicates that it expects the
members of Congress to behave as legislators .... A judicial effort, not grounded in
the Constitution, to require a particular legislative outcome amounts to depriving offi-
cials of discretion vested in them by the Constitution.").
162. For First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt's comments regarding the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, see supra note 159. Rusk further contends that this was the
understanding of Congress, the Executive, and even the United States delegates to the
United Nations:
As one of the authors of the instruction that Mrs. Roosevelt received from
her government on this point, I can report that there was no question in
Washington or in New York that the Universal Declaration was not intended to
operate as law. There was no serious consultation with the appropriate com-
mittees or Congress, as would have been essential had there been any expecta-
tion that law was coming into being. Indeed, Mrs. Roosevelt was given great
leeway in her part in the drafting of the Declaration partly because it was un-
derstood that law was not being created.
Rusk, supra note 79, at 314. This conclusion, that universal declarations are not meant
to act as controlling law, is strengthened by an examination of the bodies creating these
documents. Realizing that the United Nations is to have no sovereign authority, Rusk
articulates the nature of its "power" as understood by member States:
The [UN] Charter ... did not contemplate that the General Assembly would
be a legislative body in the field of international law generally .... There is
little doubt that a general legislative power vested in the General Assembly
would have prompted the Senate of the United States to refuse advice and
consent to the Charter.
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and the sanctity of the concept that the law is known and ascer-
tainable by persons subject to it. Congress has failed to ratify the
vast majority of human rights treaties sponsored by the United
Nations.' 63 This record indicates a general unwillingness on the
part of the United States to recognize broad principles of human
rights as controlling legal authority."' For the courts to ignore
this reality and insist that these documents form a foundation
for ascertaining the applicable law in the United States demon-
strates disdain for recognized lawmaking processes.
165
D. Democracy Concerns
Related to sovereignty and the rule of law are democracy
concerns. Lawmaking power, in democracies, lies with the
lawmakers as selected and directed by the people. 16 6 Judges do
not fit that role in the United States.16 7 Many scholars have
163. SeeJacobsen, supra note 79, at 834, 847-48 (describing the "amorphous law of
nations," arguing that the application of the ATCA is "restricted . . . by difficulty in
defining when an act is governed by the law of nations," and noting that "the Senate has
been unwilling to extend international law to encompass the protection of human
rights").
164. See id. at 849. Jacobsen states:
The Senate has refrained thus far from ratifying... numerous.., human
rights treaties, thereby expressing an unwillingness to create any internation-
ally recognized legal protections for human rights. The Senate's primary con-
cern has been that the treaty provisions might intrude upon the sovereignty of
nations and of the United States in particular.
Id.; accord id. at 847-48 ("[T]he Senate has been unwilling to extend international law
to encompass the protection of human rights."); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 8, at 869 ("Far from authorizing the application of the new CIL [customary inter-
national law] as domestic federal law, the political branches have made clear that they
do not want the new CIL to have domestic law status").
165. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith present a well-detailed argument that, "in
the absence of political branch authorization, [customary international law] is not a
source of federal law." Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 870.
166. As one author commented:
But perhaps most remarkable in this most remarkable opinion [in Roper] is
that the Court nowhere cites a treaty or convention which the United States
actually has ratified, assented to, and drawn into its domestic law without rele-
vant reservation. Rather, it has chosen to cite treaties that the United States
has quite deliberately refused to join or has joined only with reservations on
the very point at issue. So much for the paradigmatic constitutional doctrine that
binding the United States by treaty in the community of nations is a function belonging
to the political branches of government.
Anderson, supra note 57, at 36 (emphasis added).
167. See Aleinikoff, supra note 149, at 1991 ("To impose foreign law in the United
States is, in effect, to enfranchise nonresident non-citizens. It is lawmaking outside the
box.").
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noted the tendency of international law to erode sovereignty, to
the detriment of democratic lawmaking. 6 '
Thus, resort to international or foreign laws is uniquely un-
American and un-democratic. It runs completely afoul of the
observations by Alexis de Tocqueville regarding the primacy of
the "sovereignty of the people" in the United States169 :
At the present day the principle of the sovereignty of the
people has acquired in the United States all the practical de-
velopment that the imagination can conceive. It is unencum-
bered by those fictions that are thrown over it in other coun-
tries, and it appears in every possible form, according to the
exigency of the occasion. Sometimes the laws are made by
the people in a body, as at Athens; and sometimes its repre-
sentatives, chosen by universal suffrage, transact business in
its name and under its immediate supervision. 170
Tocqueville continues to describe how U.S. democracy looks in-
ternally for the source of its laws-not outside, as some today
advocate. He articulates positively that laws foreign to the U.S.
system are non-controlling:
In some countries a power exists which, though it is in a degree
foreign to the social body, directs it, and forces it to pursue a certain
track .... But nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States;
there society governs itself for itself All power centers in its bosom,
and scarcely an individual is to be met with who would venture to
conceive or, still less, to express the idea of seeking it elsewhere. The
nation participates in the making of its laws by the choice of
its legislators, and in the execution of them by the choice of
the agents of the executive government; it may almost be said
to govern itself, so feeble and restricted is the share left to the
168. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International
Law, NAT'L INT., Winter 2000-2001, at 35; Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and
American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 237 (2000).
169. As Alexis de Tocqueville explained:
In America the principle of the sovereignty of the people is neither bar-
ren nor concealed, as it is with some other nations; it is recognized by the
customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads freely, and arrives without im-
pediment at its most remote consequences. If there is a country in the world
where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated,
where it can be studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where its
dangers and advantages may be judged, that country is assuredly America.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Clas-
sics 1990) (1840).
170. Id. at 57.
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administration, so little do the authorities forget their popu-
lar origin and the power from which they emanate. The peo-
ple reign in the American political world .... They are the
cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from them,
and everything is absorbed in them.
1 71
These historical references underscore the idea that democracy
demands that the people be the masters of their own domain.
Judicial injection of foreign and supposed international law vio-
lates this principle and denigrates the reverence many have had
for the uniqueness of the U.S. system.
Federal judges are largely unaccountable to democratic
controls. 7 2 Thus, the allowance for judges to adopt or import
foreign laws presents them with un-democratic lawmaking
power. The foundation of democratic governance lies in the
people's ability, responsibility, and power to create law or con-
trol the mechanisms by which law is created. 173 Democratic con-
trol is lost when sources outside the domestic political processes
serve as the bases of decision. Kenneth Anderson accurately
opines that the government in the United States receives its con-
sent from the people and should be constrained by their ex-
pressed judgment as to what laws should and should not exist:
Without fidelity to the principle of democratic, self-governing
provenance over substantive content in the utilization of con-
stitutional adjudicatory materials, a court becomes merely a
purveyor of its own view of best policy. Yet this is not solely an
issue of an unconstrained Court. It is, more importantly, a
violation of the compact between government and governed,
free people who choose to give up a measure of their liberties
171. Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
172. See Connell, supra note 2, at 71 ("By invoking foreign authority to trump state
law, the Court has explicitly ceded American sovereignty to foreign institutions that are
not accountable to the American people."); see also Schlafly, supra note 60, at A13 ("The
effort to import international law.., aims to change our Constitution without approval
from the American people via the amendment process.").
173. As Rabkin states:
The traditional constitutional perspective starts with a premise so elemen-
tary that contemporary public law finds it impossible to take seriously. It is
that judges cannot be responsible for public policy, because they are, quite
literally, not responsible. The traditional constitutional view was that public
policy must be left to the individuals who are responsible because they are
accountable to the public.
JEREMY A. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAw DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 7
(1989).
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in return for the benefits of government-a particular pact
with a particular community, in which the materials used in
the countermajoritarian act of judging them nonetheless
have, in some fashion, even indirectly, democratic prove-
nance and consent.
174
As such, recent cases discussed herein demonstrate an an-
tidemocratic trend.171 Some have characterized such imposition
as judicial activism and arrogance against accepted lawmaking
processes.
176
Moreover, the possibility of circumventing domestic law-
making processes by injecting foreign or international law is an
enticing prospect for interest groups and others incapable of in-
fluencing the law through elected processes. 177 If courts are will-
ing to adopt extraterritorial "laws," plaintiffs, NGOs, other policy
groups, and defendants have an incentive to press principles not
expressly adopted through normal U.S. lawmaking procedures
to advance their self-interested goals.
Individuals should not be willing to surrender their demo-
cratic control over applicable law to unelected judges and
outside sources. 178 Controlling the lawmakers and the lawmak-
ing process is a fundamental tenet of democracy. The invoca-
tion of laws, statements, or edicts from international or foreign
institutions to which domestic citizens have no such control has
no place in domestic jurisprudence.
174. Anderson, supra note 57, at 49.
175. See Connell, supra note 2, at 75 ("Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority
in Lawrence further illustrates the antidemocratic effects of the Court's reliance on for-
eign law.").
176. Citing "foreign law as authority is to ... suppose fantastically that the world's
judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience." Richard A. Pos-
ner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 40, 42.
177. See Connell, supra note 2, at 68 ("The key point to understand is that the
Court's recent tendency to cite and defer to foreign authorities and values is not acci-
dental, but is the product of a concerted effort by people and organizations that see the
courts as the only practical way of imposing their values upon the American people.").
See generally Kochan, supra note 61 (predicting that the increasing influence of foreign
law will encourage interest groups to shape the development of customary international
law).
178. See Rabkin, supra note 44, at 452 ("The American Founders assumed that
sovereignty was crucial to liberty and order at home, as also to security from external
threats. That is why they took pains to 'perfect' the sovereignty of the federal govern-
ment."); see also id. at 459 ("The rights of individuals can be made more secure by
establishing sovereign authority.").
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E. Foreign Policy Concerns
When the judiciary involves itself in foreign or international
law, there are also problematic concerns involving foreign policy
and control over national security. 179 It is the province of the
elected branches to adopt or reduce into domestic law foreign
concerns.
When the judiciary itself chooses to adopt such standards or
allows private plaintiffs to present causes of action based on the
same, judicial decisions necessarily make pronouncements re-
garding the appropriate behavior of our own and foreign coun-
tries. In so acting, the judiciary risks embroiling the U.S. elected
branches in unwanted controversy. It potentially removes the
discretion and choice normally reserved to the elected branches
to determine U.S. acceptance or non-acceptance of extraterrito-
rial mandates or advice.
F. Development Concerns
Finally, economic development and its concomitant contri-
bution to the advancement of human rights and democracy can
be threatened when the judiciary meddles in foreign and inter-
national law.1" ° If corporate investment is chilled because of po-
tential international "law" liability, then economic development,
democracy, and the enhancement of human rights are chilled as
well. If courts have free reign to adopt foreign and international
laws, the certainty and predictability of law are unsettled and
thus may cause detrimental concerns. After all, people need to
know the rules they are playing by in order to be fully willing and
able to play the game. That effort is much easier if there is a
corpus of law that is identifiable. It is identifiable when compa-
nies or individuals know the source of lawmaking authority-at
home and abroad. Recognizing that judges might invoke prece-
dents from extraterritorial sources makes this process difficult
179. See Donald J. Kochan, After Burma, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 54; see also
Donald J. Kochan, Foreign Policy, Freelanced: Suits Brought Under Alien Tort Claims Act Un-
dernine Federal Government's Authority, THE RECORDER (Cal.), Aug. 23, 2000, at 5; Donald
J. Kochan, Rein In the Alien Tort Claims Act: Reconstituted Law of Nations Standard Needs
Defining by Congress, FULTON CoUNTry DAILY REP. (Ga.), Aug. 24, 2000.
180. See, e.g., MARC A. MILES ET AL., 2005 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (2005)
(arguing and documenting that market-based investment is directly correlated with the
advancement of economic freedom and other human rights).
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and indeterminate, necessarily creating investment risks that will
affect market and development activities.
For example, when private companies become subject to
ATS suits, such suits threaten to discourage the very overseas in-
vestment and development that help expand individual liberty,
human rights, and democracy abroad. New liabilities will dis-
courage foreign investment, handicapping the advancement of
human rights in developing countries. The uncertainties of ap-
plicable law that arise when judges intonate that they can look
outside our borders when deciding cases have the same effect on
investment predictability both within and outside the walls of the
United States.
CONCLUSION
Friends, strangers, and enemies exist. But when it comes to
legal interpretation, none of that should matter. A judge's
friend should be the source of his or her authority, not the opin-
ions of outsiders. Ajudge's authority should be based on sover-
eign power and the limitations of jurisdiction designated by the
Constitution. The ability to invoke foreign or international
sources that have extra-constitutional origins is simply danger-
ous, activist, and ultra vires.
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